Despite the oft-used phrase, history does not repeat itself. What history does do, however, is offer us lessons. If we do not learn history's lessons, we will repeat the mistakes of history thereby making it appear that history is indeed repeating itself.
Ottoman decision to enter the war ironically had the opposite effect. Instead of bringing the empire to new heights, it brought the empire to a new low, extinction.
The British should also bear some of the blame of Ottoman entry into the war for not agreeing to a formal alliance with the Ottomans from the beginning. The British got In addition to the better-known agreements to divide up the region, Britain also made agreements with Russia and Italy that concerned the make up of the post-war Middle East. The British believed that the key to victory on the Eastern Front was Russian entry into the war. The British strategy to achieve this was to give Russia a worthwhile prize for which to fight. The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war gave the British a prize to offer the Russians: Istanbul and the Dardanelle Straits. In
November of 1914, the British and French ambassadors in Moscow informed the Russian
Foreign Minister that Russia would be allowed to settle the matter of Istanbul and the Straits in the manner she choose. Some historians believe that the British and French did not intend to honour this promise and would push for an internationalization of the Straits following the war (Yapp, 1987, 275) . These assurances were given in the form of notes known as the Constantinople Agreement in March of 1915.
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On November 14, 1914, the Ottoman Sultan called for a holy war by all Muslims to attack the infidels living in the Christian territories in the Middle East. The British responded to this call for a holy war by attacking the Dardanelles in an attempt to open the straits and forge a route with which to attack Istanbul. Although the campaign was a military failure, it did have one success; it persuaded Italy that she should join the Entente (Yapp, 1987, 278 ). Italy's main goal was to gain territory at the head of the Adriatic Sea at the expense of Austria. Italy did not want to be left out of the post-war partition of the Middle East, and in April of 1915, the Treaty of London was signed. This treaty agreed that Italy could keep the Dodecanese Islands, which she occupied in 1912, and also receive a sphere of influence in Adalia in the western part of Asia Minor at the end of the war. Subsequent agreements gave Italy Izmir and Konya but these agreements were subject to Russian approval, which was never obtained, and Britain and France claimed that no further promises had been made to Italy.
These agreements are important for two reasons. First, they are blueprints of the later, more famous, or infamous, agreements which Britain signed. The British were offering pieces of the Ottoman Empire as incentive to woo potential allies. At this early stage of the war, the British could not have been sure of an allied victory. The British were promising territory to one nation, which belonged to another nation, whom Britain could not have been sure of ultimately defeating, in an attempt to gain allies with whom to fight the Germans. The second, and more important reason is that these territorial payments to Russia and Italy meant that Britain and France would seek their own compensation from Ottoman territory following the war (Yapp, 1987, 276) .
When the British attacked the Dardanelles, the Ottomans launched a counter attack on the British holdings at the Suez Canal. The Ottomans hoped that this would stir In the summer of 1915, these negotiations took a more serious turn. Abdullah changed his demands and insisted that the British approve a post-war caliphate, ruled by Hussein. This caliphate would include an independent Arab nation spanning from Cilicia in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south, and from the Mediterranean in the west to Iran in the east. Britain agreed with forming a caliphate ruled by Hussein, but thought it was premature to discuss any questions of the boundaries of an independent Arab nation.
Although a few months prior, Britain had promised specific territory to Italy and Russia.
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Hussein sent a letter saying that the territorial demands were a necessary requirement of any agreement between he and the British. He added that the territorial demands came not from him, but came from the Arab people. (Fromkin, 1989, 177) . Talk of rallying hundreds of thousands of Arabs, whether Hussein and Al Faruki believed it or not, was sheer fantasy. Despite the Turkification policy of the Young Turks and the crushing of Arab dissent by Djemal Pasha in the Levant, most Arabs remained loyal to the Ottomans throughout the war.
Prior to turning to the British for an alliance, Hussein learned that the Young Turks, who were busy crushing Arab dissent throughout the empire, planned to depose him. He had no choice to rebel no matter what Britain pledged to give him (Fromkin, 1989, 185) . Even after he began his rebellion, he continued to negotiate with the Ottomans and offered to halt the rebellion if his Sharifate in Mecca was made hereditary.
If anything, Hussein was lying to Britain about his intentions, not the other way around.
In reading the McMahon Hussein Correspondence, Britain really committed to nothing. Britain said that she could promise nothing to the detriment of her ally France or the other Arab chiefs with whom she had agreements (Fromkin, 1989, 183) . Although Russia and Italy were not mentioned, Britain must have been thinking of these prior agreements. Also, Britain pledged to support Arab independence only if Hussein could stir up an Arab rebellion. As mentioned above, this rebellion never happened. In fact, the so called Great Arab Revolt didn't even carry Medina. The British also implied that the independent Arab nation was to be subject to British advice and assistance.
Aside from his counter negotiations with the Young Turks, Hussein needs to shoulder more blame. Hussein never wanted independence for the Arabs; he wanted his own Hashemi rule for the Arabs. From the beginning, he called himself "King of the Arabs", which was simply not true. In fact, years later, Ibn Saud, his rival to the east, would defeat him and chase him out of the Arabian Peninsula. Hussein was not even King of the Neighbourhood. The revolt never had anything to do with any idea of nationalism. It was the glitter of British gold that rallied the Hijazi Bedouins behind the revolt, not the idea of any type of Pan Arab nationalism (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 191) . Fromkin (223) puts the cost of this rebellion to the British at £11 million, an equivalent of $400 million today. This a high price to pay for an ineffective operation that was really the imperialist vision of a local leader who represented little more than himself (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 184) . Hussein knew the Young Turks would depose him so he turned to Britain and tried to strike the best deal he could. While the British were paying him handsomely, he went behind their backs and attempted to strike a better deal with the Young Turks. If the British can be blamed for anything, it is their mistaken belief of a vast Arab, Muslim conspiracy (Fromkin, 1989, 275) . It was the British fear of, and desire to harness, Pan Islam and Pan Arabism that led to the McMahon Hussein Correspondence. Britain wished to ally herself with this secret society and have it work for her, not against her. It was this mistaken belief that not only cost Britain monetarily, but would also continue to haunt the Middle East for years to come.
One of the important effects of the McMahon Hussein Correspondence is that
Britain needed France's consent. Britain responded to this needed French consent the same way she responded every time she needed consent during the war; she promised Ottoman territory. In what would become known as the Sykes Picot Agreement, the French claim was submitted very quickly. France wanted Syria. France saw itself as the protector of the Christian prior, particularly the Catholic Maronite Christians, in the Levant. Prior to Ottoman entry into the war, Francois Georges-Picot had lobbied for an armed uprising of the Maronites and a French expeditionary force be sent to Syria to contain any British intentions in the region. The French deluded themselves (Fromkin, 1989, 190-191) . Not only did most people in Syria not see the French as their protectors, but also most were vehemently opposed to French rule. Britain agreed with the French claim to Syria because Sir Mark Sykes wanted the French to form a wall in the northern part of the Middle East between Russia and the British holdings in Arabia and India (Fromkin, 1989, 190-191) .
Britain was a little slower to present her claim. Britain had various minor goals she hoped to gain at the war's conclusion. These goals, however, were modest compared to French annexatio n of the Levant and the government set up a committee led by Sir Maurice de Bunsen to consider more far-reaching goals. One of the members of this committee, Sir Mark Sykes, concluded that Iraq should be the centre of British aspirations. He saw the region as the logical extension of the present British position in the Persian Gulf. Another line of reasoning was that Iraq was an extension of the British Indian sphere of influence in the east. Sykes went on to suggest that the British possession in Iraq should be supplied from the Mediterranean Sea to the west, not from the Indian colony to the east. This made it necessary for the British to demand a port on the Mediterranean Sea, which Sykes suggested be Haifa. Agreement was never reached on Palestine and in the end; it was to be governed by some sort of international administration. Interestingly, there was no mention of the Jews living in Palestine at the time anywhere in the Sykes Picot Agreement (Fromkin, 1989, 196 In an analysis of the Sykes Picot agreement, Britain and France should both be blamed for being naïve. In 1915, the war was nowhere near victory and neither nation could count on an allied victory anywhere, let alone in the Middle East. It is hard to believe that either side thought the agreement binding. The French immediately began secret negotiations with Russia to undo the agreement. Later British behaviour also made it clear that neither side was very happy with the deal. It is also alleged that the British and French sold out the Arabs. It is interesting to note that the agreement contained a passage that granted Arab independence in the interior of the region. This was the first time any power, including the Ottomans to whom most of the Arabs remained loyal, ever considered independence for the Arabs (Fromkin, 1989, 185) . In addition, the French, and later the British, were attempting to sell out one another, not the Arabs.
Of all the wartime negotiations, it is perhaps the Balfour Declaration that has caused the greatest controversy in the region. This declaration was contained in a letter sent to a prominent Zionist, Lord Rothschild, by British foreign secretary Lord Balfour.
In this letter, Balfour promised that Britain would "look favourably" on "a national home Zionists that the French "feel sympathy for your cause" (Morris, 2001, 74) . Certainly the words "look favourably" are no stronger or binding than "feel sympathy". Yet it was the British, who would be given a mandate in Palestine, and the Balfour Declaration who for years would be blamed for the situation in the Middle East.
Much has been made of just why Balfour wrote these words. Some believe that it was a political move to garner the support of Jews in the United States and Russia. At this time, Mark Sykes believed that an allied victory was unlikely and that the Jews could tip the balance (Fromkin, 1989, 197) . Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Balfour Declaration was seen as a way to keep the Russians in the war on the side of the Allies.
With England fighting for a Jewish homeland, the Jewish populations in Russia might push their nation for greater involvement in the war. Similarly, the Jews in the United States would push for American entrance into the war. Just as the British believed in the power of a vast Arab conspiracy, they also believed in the power of a vast Jewish conspiracy. In fact, the British ambassador in Turkey believed that the Young Turk Revolution was the work of an international conspiracy of Jews, Freemasons and Zionists (Segev, 1999, 38) . Just as the plan to control these ethnic conspiracies did not work with the Arabs, it did not work with the Jews. The Russians did not come back into the war.
And the United States was slow to enter the war. 13.4 million people immigrated to the US from 1900-1914. Many of these were form belligerent countries in World War I and they were opposed to a US alliance with the Allies (Smith, 1999, 51) . Also, there was a prevalence of anti-Semitism in the US at this time (Christison, 1999, 24) . President
Wilson was against the idea of Zionism because it conflicted with his idea of selfdetermination. His advisor, Colonel Edward Mandell House, added It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making (The Middle East) a breeding place for future war (Morris, 2001, 73) .
More importantly, only 1% of the world's Jews were Zionists (Fromkin, 1989, 294) . Minis ter (Segev, 1999, 37) . Lloyd George wanted to undo the Sykes Picot agreement and keep the French out of the Levant. He claimed that the agreement was not binding and that physical possession after the war was all that mattered (Fromkin, 1989, 267) .
Lloyd George believed that Zionism was a hugely influential political power with whose goodwill was worth any price to form an alliance (Segev, 1999, 38) . The Balfour Declaration was a way to garner this power and court world opinion. Just as the French tried to gain an upper hand in Palestine with their secret agreement with Russia, the British were now trying to gain an upper hand by making an agreement with the Zionists.
The declaration had nothing to do with Britain's support of world Jewry. The Zionist leader in Britain, Weizman, discovered a way to extract acetone, which was needed in the manufacture of explosives, from maize. Later George would call the Balfour Declaration a reward from a generous ruler to his court Jew (Segev, 1999, 43) . When Balfour was Prime Minister in 1905, he sponsored laws to restrict immigration to Britain, which caused him to be branded an anti-Semite (Segev, 1999, 40-41 ).
An analysis of the Balfour Declaration reads quite similar to the McMahon Hussein Correspondence. Like its predecessor, the Balfour Declaration was basically meaningless and committed Britain to nothing (Yapp, 1987, 290) . If the provisions were taken seriously, nothing could have been done that did not affect the rights of the current residents in Palestine. The language was equally vague. Just what did "look favourably" on a "national homeland" mean? In addition, Britain saw the declaration as just another in a long line of wartime documents that would have to be settled in negotiations following the conclusion of the war. No sooner was in published, that it was forgotten by all except the Zionists (Yapp, 1987, 291) .
Much attention has been given to the Balfour Declaration's treatment of the native Arab population in Palestine. Yet others were also very involved in this treatment of the Palestinians. Hussein's son Faisal, wishing to become a king in Syria (of which Palestine was currently a part) and seeking to fend off French claims in the region, agreed with Weizman to a "racial kinship and ancient bonds" with his Jewish brothers (Morris, 2001, 79-80) . He agreed to share Palestine with the Zionists. T.E. Lawrence, better known as 'Lawrence of Arabia', disagreed with this decision (Morris, 2001, 89) .
2 Britain can be blamed, as in the McMahon Hussein Correspondence case, for being too quick to believe in vast religious conspiracies. Just as they believed in a vast Arab conspiracy, London believed in vast Jewish societies that controlled the world (Fromkin, 1989, 198) .
Ironically, the Zionist move ment, which Britain believed to be the centre of world influence, was actually contained in four small rooms in Piccadilly Circus (Segev, 1999, 45) . The Israeli journalist and historian Tom Segev (33) sums up the British aims in Palestine as follows:
The British entered Palestine to defeat the Turks; they stayed there to keep it from the French; then they gave it to the Zionists because they loved 'the Jews' even as they loathed them, at once admired and despised them and above all feared them…they believed the Jews controlled the world.
The Balfour Declaration was also quite possibly a British attempt to punish the Palestinians for not rallying behind the Great Arab Revolt and remaining loyal to the Ottomans during the war. Years later Lloyd George was asked if the British ever consulted the native Arab population on their views of the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He sardonically replied, "We could not get in touch with the Palestinian Arabs as they were fighting against us" (Fromkin, 1989, 297) .
I believe the main reason for Britain's own territorial aims in the Middle East, and the agreements they spawned, was an attempt to preserve the British Empire. In fighting the war, Britain used many resources from her colonies, especially Australia and New
Zealand. As a reward for their services in the war, these nations pushed for their own autonomy and were granted it by sending their own delegations to the post-war negotiations (Mc Kale, 1998, 145) . The loss of control of these parts of her empire made it even more important for Britain to build future colonies in the Middle East. Ironically, as Britain was attempting to end one empire, the Ottoman, she was attempting to preserve her own.
Much has also been made of the harsh treatment the British gave the Arabs and Ottomans in the treaties ending the war. I believe this is also an unfair criticism. The
Allies had an overwhelming feeling that they had just won a long and bitter struggle.
They wanted to ensure the residents of their nations that this war had not been fought in vain. They also wanted to teach a lesson to all potential foes that starting another war against them was a foolish undertaking (Yapp, 1987, 290) . Most of the Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire and fought against the British. The Entente wanted to show that this attempt had failed miserably and that severe punishment awaited all whom mimicked this attack. The Entente wanted to teach the very concept of Pan Islamism a lesson (Yapp, 1987, 290) . But this was just not a social Darwinian attempt to punish the Orient for daring to challenge the power of Europe. It is important to keep in mind that the Allies were punishing their fellow European Germans just as badly, if not worse, than they were punishing the Ottomans and Arabs in the Middle East.
In a final analysis of the World War I wartime agreements, the contradictions cannot be blamed solely, or even mostly, on the British. The wording was vague, the promises were all contingent on actions of the other parties, and none of the provisions were to happen unless the war ended in an Allied victory. If we follow the letter of the law in these agreements, Britain did not contradict, or fail to live up to the conditions of any of the agreements. All of the parties were trying to defeat one another, none of the parties were living up to their promises in the treaties, and all of the parties were, despite what they said, only interested in bettering their own positions. If Britain can be blamed for anything, it is the mistaken belief that secret ethnic societies, that held vast power, could be tapped and led to a quicker Allied victory. In the end, the contradictory wartime agreements must be blamed on all the parties involved, not just the Western powers.
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Britain also receives criticism for a recreation of the Middle East following World War I. After all, it was with the war's conclusion that the Middle East was reshaped and recreated from a political arrangement under which Arabs had lived for 400 years. But like the wartime agreements, Britain should not receive much blame for the post-war settlements. Britain wished for a post-war set up that served her interests. When Britain realized that this ideal set-up was not possible, she decided that her interests could be safeguarded in another way, by compromise with people in society who would come to an agreement with the British to further their own interests (Hourani, 1991, 325 (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 267) . In fact, Wilson was the first US president to leave the western hemisphere while he was in office. This action made Britain and France nervous (Fromkin, 1989, 390) . Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter, an article that Wilson authored, said that the wishes of the former Ottoman subjects must be a "principal consideration" in selecting a mandatory power in Syria (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 267) . Wilson proposed a commission be sent to the area and determine the will of the local residents. France and Britain both opposed this commission and it became a purely American venture. This King-Crane Commission visited Syria and reported that it was only the Catholic community that wanted French rule. They stated that an anti-French feeling was "deep rooted" in the Syrians. They uncovered "some evidence" that the French soldiers had attempted to keep some people from reaching the commission. The majority of the population wanted independence, or if a mandate was necessary, wanted the Americans or British, to have that mandate. The Zionists opposed the possibility of an American mandate because the US style of democracy ran counter to their plan for a national home in Palestine (Segev, 1999, 119 (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 259) . Even Mark Sykes, the coauthor of the Sykes Picot agreement believed that the agreement was no longer valid due to changing international events (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 261) . The Prime Minister told France that they could not have Syria because
Faisal's Arab army had liberated it and General Allenby was in charge. This was far from the truth. During the war, the British wanted Faisal's Arab troops to liberate Syria. They saw this as an ideal way to keep France out of the region. Faisal had become Britain's favourite of the Hashemite family because he, unlike his father, listened to British advice (Fromkin, 1989, 329 At this time, the attitude of the Syrian Arabs began to change (Yapp, 1987, 324 (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 278-279) .
When the British withdrew, sporadic violence erupted throughout the country. Rival tribes were fighting for control of Syria in Faisal's name (Fromkin, 1989, 435 Faisal the crown of Greater Syria. Against Faisal's wishes, the congress also declared an independent Syria that included Palestine (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 284) . The congress quickly signed and adopted a constitution. This was all unacceptable to France, who was officially given a mandate to rule Syria and Lebanon. This was also unacceptable to (Fromkin, 1989, 442) . Britain felt by putting Abdullah in control of the area, they could keep the territory out of anarchy and keep the French out of the region (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 324) . The
Zionists were not happy with this proposed severing of the area they thought had been promised to them (Morris, 2001, 100 (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 324) . Neither of these plans ever came to fruition.
As a result of the war, Britain was in the strongest position of all powers in Arabia (Fromkin, 1989, 494) . The British soldiers, following the war, wanted to return home. In the summer of 1919, financial problems and social unrest at home, made the British withdraw their troops from Syria. The Times agreed saying that Britain needed to stop spending money abroad on foolish Middle East adventures, and start concentrating on the problems at home (Fromkin, 1989, 470) . This led to a new make up of the Middle East that was not the ideal situation for which the British wished, but a series of compromises with France, the local Arab population, and most importantly, Britain's Hashemite allies.
The new countries in the Middle East were not artificial British lines. They were artificial creations based on compromise between the imperial greed of the Hashemites and the British desire to defer to them when the British realized the realities of the region (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 351 (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 349-351) . It has often been said that the artificial borders of these new states ruined any potential for Arab unity. That is not the case. In fact, at this point in history, Arab nationalism was not directed against Europe in an attempt to build one Arab nation. It was directed at problems of identity and local political organization (Hourani, 1991, 310) . The mistake the British made, besides once again committing themselves to the Hashemites, was in creating nations with larger borders than would have otherwise been possible (Karsh & Karsh, 1999, 353-354) .
It is perhaps Palestine that continues to be the source of the most unrest in the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire ruled the area of Palestine from 1517-1918. During this time, Palestine was never a separate administrative district. In the 1870s, the area was part of Syria. In 1887 Jerusalem became an independent district directly ruled by
Istanbul. The rest of Palestine became part of the villayet of Beirut. In the late Nineteenth Century, the Zionists began to purchase land from Arab landowners and some peasants (Kazemi & Waterbury, 1991, 144) . More land in Palestine was always available for purchase than the Jews could afford, and some of the sellers were members of the Arab nationalist movement (Segev, 1999, 273) . As these land purchases began to dispossess some of the Arab villagers from their homes, the conflict began. The King
Crane Commission stated that the Arabs had been friendly to the Jews who lived in Palestine prior to the Zionist program but would resist any future Zionist immigration.
The Zionists wanted to be Europeans and always considered themselves to be better than the Arabs, and to the Jews who were living in Palestine prior to the Zionist immigration (Segev, 1999, 149) .
In addition to the British, two parties were interested in Palestine. out the League's wishes. This committee had no real power and the British, for the most part, ruled as they pleased (Segev, 1999, 161-162) . The British realized early on that they could not create any type of government that would accommodate both the Arabs and the Zionists so they decided to retain direct military control of Palestine (Hourani, 1991, 331) . In the end, no one was happy with the situation in Palestine. The Arabs were Mark A. Larson
The Lessons of Middle East Involvement 28 upset that Palestine had been separated from Syria and did not become a part of an independent Arab area. The Zionists were not happy that Transjordan had been separated from Palestine (Segev, 199, (158) (159) . Even the British on the scene were not happy with the outcome. The King Crane Commission said that "many officials" including General
Allenby wanted an American mandate in the region so that Britain could escape from the region's problems. The British military saw Zionism as a nuisance and did not want conflict with the Arabs (Segev, 1999, 86) and despised the civilians in London telling them what to do (Segev, 1999, 63-64) . These four sides, the Arabs, the Zionists, British officials in London, and the British army in Palestine were on a collision course.
While the League of Nations was debating the mandate, the first violence in Palestine broke out. The British investigated the source of this violence and blamed the Jews. The military halted Jewish immigration and raided the Zionist offices. This angered the Zionists. Richard Meinertzhagen, the political officer to General Allenby, claimed that the British military initiated the riots to prove that Zionism was an unsound policy (Segev, 1999, 140) . The Zionists became even more angered when all Arabs arrested in this violence were released they the British military (Segev, 1999, 98) . The
Zionists claimed that the British officials in Palestine were not carrying out the instructions of the British officials in London. The British officials on the scene tried to play the middle road and appease both sides in an effort to prevent violence. This was a pattern that would continue.
Throughout the British mandate in Palestine, both sides would protest British actions, accusing the authorities of favouring the other side. In May 1921, there were more riots in Jaffa. This led to a British commission of inquiry that blamed the Arabs for the violence, but gave them a great deal of understanding (Segev, 1999, 187) . Following the violence in Hebron in 1929, the British chancellor issued a report condemning the violence and blaming the violence solely on the Arabs. The Arabs complained at this unfair treatment so the commission issued a second, less harshly worded statement, which caused the Zionists to protest (Segev, 1999, 327) .
In violence were almost all peasants, and many prominent Arabs in the rural regions left for the cities during these uprisings (Kazemi & Waterbury, 1991, 164) . The British government in London wanted the British forces to refrain from responding to this uprising, believing that the violence would subside on its own. The British military officials in Palestine wanted to crush it and thought the officials in London were weak.
The Zionists wanted to sit out and let the British army take care of it (Morris, 2001, 131-136) . The villagers who stayed in the area and did not participate in the violence were left in a dilemma that is still a problem in Palestine to this day. If they gave cover to the rebels, they faced punishment from the British military; if they turned the terrorists over to the British authorities, they faced reprisal from the rebels (Kazemi & Waterbury, 1991, 423) .
During this time, the attitude of the British in London began to change. The conventional wisdom in London was that the British had erred in supporting Zionism (Segev, 1999, 37) . An analysis of the British mandate in Palestine is much like the analysis of other British involvement; all sides must share in the blame for the problems. The Ottomans and Arabs must be blamed for selling land to the Zionists; the Hashemites must be blamed for once again, selling out the Arabs in an attempt to further their own cause; the Zionists must be blamed for considering themselves colonizers out to civilize the Arabs;
both the Zionists and Arabs must be blamed for not wanting to compromise (something of which they can still be blamed today) and the British must be blamed for once again trying to find compromise and playing both sides of the issue.
The history of this period offers the United States many lessons that it should consider when formulating its foreign policy today.
Pan-Arabism (Islam) is not a credible threat. The British fear of a Pan Arab revolt that would threaten her holdings in Egypt and India led the British to contact Sharif
Hussein in an attempt to use this power for Britain's own good. The revolt was an expensive military failure and this alliance with the Hashemites brought Britain many problems after the war. Today, we still hear this fear from the United States. Prior to the Gulf War, the experts predicted a disaster in the region. There would be upheavals in every Arab country; Americans would be slaughtered in the streets; the Arab world would unify and turn its weapons against the United States. None of this happened (DeAtkine, 1993, 53) . This opinion has also been reiterated in the current war on
terrorism. Yet the historical record shows that this idea of Arab unity is merely a myth.
The so-called Arab Revolt never culminated in the mass rebellion the British believed would happen. In The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence, an instruction manual for British officers in the Middle East, the author said, A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another…Do not mix Bedou and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen…I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures.
Following the conclusion of World War I, the King Crane Commission discove red that the Syrians did not want a union with the Hijaz, or Mesopotamia for that matter, because they believed that Syria was in a more advanced state of civilization than either region.
Ironically, the Hashemites believed that the only real Arabs came from the Arabian peninsula and that the Palestinians and Syrians were backward people. During the violence in mandated Palestine, more Arabs were killed by other Arabs in inter-tribal looting than were killed by the British or Jews (Morris, 2001, 151) . In addition, several Arabs, including some mayors accused of collaborating with the Jews or the British, were killed by Arabs (Segev, 1999, 369) . This same situation is repeating itself today during the current conflict. Suspected collaborators are dragged from their cells and shot at point-blank range. Nationalism never developed into Pan Arabism because each nation was subject to a different type of colonial rule. Because of this, each nation developed a separate national movement that was not unifiable with the others (Hourani, 1991, 342) .
Just as the Sultan's cry for a holy war fell on deaf ears during World War I, Sadaam
Hussein's cry for a holy war against the US-led coalition fell on deaf ears during the Gulf War. I have always considered the idea that all Arabs and Muslims think and act alike and will join together to fight the "other" a racist idea. We do not ever hear about Pan Christianism, or Pan Europeanism or even Pan Asianism, Pan Africanism, or Pan Latinosim. This "fear" should not be cons idered when the United States formulates its foreign policy.
The belief in Pan Judaism is equally invalid. Just as there was not, and is not, a vast Arab movement, the existence of a vast Jewish movement also proves to be a false belief. The Balfour Declaration did not cause this imagined Jewish conspiracy to convince Russia to stay in World War I, it did not get the United States to declare war against the Ottomans, and it did not get the Americans to accept a mandate in the region.
Even during the early days of Zionism, the Jews were not a united movement. Most of the Jews who lived in Palestine before the Zionist emigration were ultra-Orthodox people who did not support the secular idea of Zionism. The Zionists did not accept the ultraOrthodox personnel who had no income and were dependent on donations from Jews back home (Segev, 1999, 16) . Weizmann even went so far as to state his distaste for
Jerusalem and "the old Jews" who lived there, believing they were "no better" than the Arabs living in Palestine (Segev, 1999, 70-70) . During the mandate, the Zionist leaders continued to prefer the rural areas believing that the Kibbutzim were the guardians of the land and that it was these settlements that would determine the future borders of the Jewish national home. The Zionists pushed agriculture in the education program believing that a broad education would encourage the populace to leave Palestine (Segev, 1999, 249-259) .
During the height of Jewish immigration to Palestine, only one out of every 4000 of the world's Jews came to Palestine, and that was only when the United States closed its doors to immigration in 1924 (Segev, 1999, 225) . The Zionists, although wishing for a high number of immigrants to create a Jewish majority in Palestine, did not want anyone without money showing up (Segev, 1999, 229 his Revisionist party "a party of Nazis" (Segev, 1999, 386) . Even during the Holocaust, an event that should have united the Jews of the world, Ben Gurion said, "The catastrophe of European Jews is not, in a direct manner, my business" (Segev, 1999, 162) . Even today the Israeli government is far from united in backing Sharon's policies and his military commanders have even refused to carry out some of his orders. Just as the belief that the Arabs are somehow all alike and united, the belief that the Jews are all alike and united is a racist idea that does not need to be considered in the formulation of United States' foreign policy. United States is continuing this incorrect line of thinking. Many in the United States today believe that free trade and economic aid will create a stable, friendly region. This is not happening. Saudi Arabia, while supporting US strategic interests, encourages their state-controlled media to demonize America as a way to redirect anger from the Saudi's political failures (Hoffman, 2002, 86-87) . Al Ahram, the leading newspaper in Egypt, a big recipient of US foreign aid, published a story suggesting that the United States poisoned relief packages and dropped them in mine fields in Afghanistan (Hoffman, 2002, 88) . In the November/September edition of Foreign Affairs, Fouad Ajami, a
Professor at Johns Hopkins University, wrote:
The United States could grant generous aid to the Egyptian state, but there would be no dampening of the anti-American fury of the Egyptian political class…On September 11, 2001, there was an unmistakable sense of glee and little sorrow among upper class Egyptians…only satisfaction that America had gotten its comeuppance…There will be chameleons good at posing as America's friends but never turning up when needed.
Israel, the largest recipient of US foreign aid, can also be added to this list. Despite pleas from the Bush administration, the Israelis seem more intent than ever to increase settlements and crush the Arabs militarily. While it would be foolish to suggest a total abandonment of free trade and economic assistance, the US would be wise to reformulate the conditions that are attached to foreign aid. While this would be seen in the short run as US arrogance in insisting that everyone become more American-like, in the long run, it would ensure that the Middle East become more affluent and democratic. Mere monetary aid, without an accompanying program of nation-building, will not end this cycle of antiAmericanism.
Dealing with leaders in the Middle East is a precarious undertaking. The
British did not wish to spend the money and manpower at stabilizing the Middle East so they looked for friendly leaders upon whom they could use to protect their interests. In his 27 Articles, T.E. Lawrence wrote that the British should "wave a Sharif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person". The British followed this advice and developed a relationship with the Hashemite family, a policy that would ultimately fail in all nations but Jordan. Yet it is not merely the Western-oriented political leaders that added to the instability of the Middle East; it was also a new class of people that began to arise in the late Nineteenth Century, the economic elites. As the Ottoman Empire lost power vis a vis the European powers, many people in the Middle East were exposed to the western way of life. As people went to Europe and received European educations in European languages, they would return to the Middle East and establish new Western-style schools in the rural areas. At the same time people in the urban areas were talking about Arab nationalism and Islamic reform, people in the rural areas were producing works of Islamic theology and learning (Hourani, 1991, 311) . The urban schools created educated elites whose economic interests lay with the West, but the rural religious schools continued to create people educated in the traditional, religious way of life whose interests were not associated with the West (Hourani, 1991, 348 ). Yet this disparity was not simply rural versus urban. The Ottoman Empire introduced the idea of land ownership as part of the Tanzimant Reforms. This split the rural areas into two groups: large estates with irrigation, and small farms without irrigation (Hourani, 1991, 334-335) . Coupled with this economic disparity, modernizatio n also reduced the power that local elites had enjoyed for so long. This system of direct rule arrived first in the urban areas. At this time the local rural leaders, men of religion, still had some authority.
When direct rule spread to the countryside, some of these elites led a rebellion that had a religious fervour (Hourani, 1991, 312) . It was Sharif Hussein of Mecca, a religious leader threatened by the modernization of the Ottoman Empire, who turned to Great
Britain to help him from losing his power. In the present day, most of the religious militants still come from the rural areas. It is easy to see these militants as religious zealots and their religion as the cause of their anger, but the real cause of this anger is economic disparity. Until this disparity is alleviated, this anger will continue. The process of modernization and the rebellion it bred is being repeated today with the process of globalization. It is not surprising that the activity of these militants has increased in recent years with the global economy upsetting traditional ways of life. (Segev, 1999, 64) . The Arabs rejected the UN partition idea in 1948, believing that in a war, they would drive the Jews to the sea. Not only did this not occur, but also it is this very idea of partition that is at the top on most Arab's list for a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem. The Jews, coming to believe more and more that the British were the problem, wanted the British out. Today, it is the Palestinians and some within the Arab world, that urge the United States to make Israel withdraw from the occupied territories or halt their military incursions into the Arab camps. Frustrated with the decisions of the Israeli government, the Palestinians resort to violence to coax an outside power to intervene and force a more favourable political solution (Ajami, 2001, 13 Empire as an economic and military power, the Muslims in the area began to wonder how they could remain Muslims, but compete with the Western infidels. The Christians of the region never had this problem and began to secede from the empire. In order to preserve the empire, Ottomanism (a reaction to European nationalism) began to take on more of an Islamic fervour (Hourani, 1991, 306-309) . In addition, as the empire became more interactive with the West, some Europeans immigrated to the Ottoman Empire. In the countries with large European populations, these foreigners controlled finance, industry, foreign trade, and more and more, the land (Hourani, 1999, 322 And, in the September 13 issued of Al-Hayat, a Saudi daily published in London,
As for (Americans) deduc ing the implications (of 9-11), it is unlikely to occur, because the Zionist mind -which manages the US machinery through politics, money, and media -will not permit it. The logical deduction should question why the United States in particular? Why its people? What is the main concealed Israeli secret behind it?" (italics mine)
Ironically, our Zionist Israeli clients do not see it that way. We can read in the editorials of the Jerusalem Post, an English language newspaper that is anything but a right-wing publication, the Western press, so wondrously evenhanded over the years regarding events in Israel that it has created the intellectual underpinnings on which Palestinian terrorism flourishes (April 1, 2002) (the) New York Times (portrayed) Idris (a female suicide bomber) as someone who 'raised doves and adored children'…(not as someone) whose goal was to murder as many innocent Israelis as possible…the media frequently commit sins of omission (March 3, 2002) the US is so worried about Arab opinion it is willing to protect Arafat's terrorist regime for its ally Israel (March 18. 2002) Hashemites, who were self-interested and willing to make any concession that bettered their own situation, the United States must find people who are more interested in bettering the region as a whole than bettering their own personal situation. Sadly, America seems to have found their own self-interested allies today and the end result of this situation will inevitably be the same as the British policy of self-interested allies; 
